





no 1130 / december 2009
monetary Policy  




by Simona Delle ChiaieWORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1130 / DECEMBER 2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge from
http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1520350.
In 2009 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€200 banknote.
MONETARY POLICY AND POTENTIAL 
OUTPUT UNCERTAINTY
 A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 1
by Simona Delle Chiaie 2
1   I am specially grateful to Francesco Lippi, Fabio Canova, Antonio Guarino, Stefano Neri, Lucio Sarno, Carl Walsh for helpful suggestions. I also 
thank seminar participants at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Sveriges Riksbank for useful comments. Of course I take full 
responsibility for any errors or omissions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the European Central Bank or Oesterreichische National Bank. Part of this work was done while the author was visiting
the University of Pompeu Fabra, whose kind hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
2   Oesterreichische National Bank, Economic Studies Division, Otto-Wagner Platz 3, 1090 Wien, Austria; e-mail: simona.delle-chiaie@oenb.at© European Central Bank, 2009
Address 
Kaiserstrasse 29 
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Postal address 
Postfach 16 03 19 
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Telephone 




+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s). 
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB 
Working Paper Series is available from 





Working Paper Series No 1130
December 2009
Abstract  4
Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  6
2  The model economy  7
3 Estimation  9
3.1 Estimation  results  10
4  Potential output uncertainty and
monetary policy  11
5 Robustness  13
5.1  Changes in priors  13
5.2  Alternative timing for indicators  13
6 Concluding  remarks  14
Appendix  15
References  18
Tables and ﬁ  gures 20
European Central Bank Working Paper Series  28
CONTENTS4
ECB




I estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the policymaker and 
the private sector have imperfect knowledge about potential output. The estimation of 
the structural parameters and of the monetary authorities’objectives is key to assess 
the quantitative relevance of the imperfect information problem and to evaluate the 
robustness of previous exercises based on calibration. The estimated model also 
allows me to revisit the Orphanides (2001, 2003) findings that the central bank can 
makes large and persistent mistakes to estimate potential output in response to 
productivity and cost shocks. I find that when real unit labor cost is used as a 
monetary policy indicator, the potential output uncertainty has quantitatively 
negligible consequences on policy behaviour and inflation dynamics. 
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Non-technical summary
The inability of central banks to observe potential output in real-time has received atten-
tion as having important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. For instance,
several authors have highlighted how the signi￿cant misperception of potential output,
following the productivity slowdown of the early 1970s, may have contributed to the rise
of U.S. in￿ ation. In this paper, I revisit the issue by estimating a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model where the policymaker and the private sector have imperfect
knowledge about potential output. Using the model structural estimates, I show how the
quantitative implications of potential output uncertainty crucially hinge on the policy-
maker￿ s information set. This is done by comparing the case in which the central bank
uses noisy measures of output, in￿ ation and real unit labor cost to estimate the potential
output level with the counterfactual situation in which the real unit labor cost indicator
is removed from the central bank￿ s vector of observables. An interesting contrast emerges
between the scenarios. The results show that the central bank makes large and persistent
errors in forecasting the output gap, when output and in￿ ation are the only indicators
used to estimate the potential output. In particular, following a unitary decrease in po-
tential output, the output gap is perceived as negative for about 7 quarters, while its
true value is actually positive. The forecast error leads optimal policy to deviate from
its benchmark value of full information causing a persistent in￿ ation hike (for about 12
quarters) in comparison with the complete information case. Instead, when monetary
policy makes use of the real unit labor cost indicator (in addition to output and in￿ a-
tion data), then potential output uncertainty turns out to have quantitatively negligible
consequences on in￿ ation dynamics and on the policy makers￿welfare.6
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1 Introduction
Central banks￿inability to observe the potential output in real-time has received attention
as having important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. For example, Or-
phanides (2001, 2003), Lansing (2000), Cukierman and Lippi (2005) have highlighted how
the signi￿cant misperception of potential output, following the productivity slowdown of
the early 1970s, may have contributed to the rise of U.S. in￿ ation.
Although these previous studies shed light on the economic mechanisms by which the
imprecise measurement of potential output might a⁄ect the policy behavior and thus, the
dynamics of in￿ ation, they have been conducted mainly by means of calibrations (e.g.
Ehrmann and Smets (2003), Cukierman and Lippi (2005)).
This approach turns out to be not exhaustive since quantitative ￿ndings depend on
the particular set of calibrated parameter values. For instance, the size and persistence of
the potential output forecast errors and, therefore to what extent policy deviates from the
ideal full information benchmark depend on the relative variance of potential output and
cost-push shocks. Common welfare measures, such as the central bank expected losses
and its ability to control in￿ ation, the output gap and the interest rate adjustments also
depend on the covariance matrix of the shocks as well as weights attached to the central
bank￿ s objective function.
This paper contributes to this recent quantitative literature on the monetary policy
consequences of the imperfect information about potential output along several dimen-
sions.
First, this paper estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE)
which explicitly accounts for the incomplete information about the state of the economy
by means of Bayesian techniques. The estimation of the structural parameters and of the
monetary authorities￿objectives allows to appraise empirically the quantitative impor-
tance of the potential output uncertainty and also, provides a benchmark for evaluating
the robustness of previous calibrations.
Second, this paper illustrates that the quantitative implications of the potential out-
put uncertainty crucially hinge on the information set available to the policymaker. This
is done by comparing the case in which the central bank uses noisy measures of output,
in￿ ation and real unit labor cost to estimate the potential output level with the counter-
factual situation in which the real unit labor cost indicator is removed from the central
bank￿ s vector of observables.
An interesting contrast emerges between the two potential output estimates. The
results reveal that the central bank makes a large and persistent error in forecasting the
output gap, when output and in￿ ation are the only observables that are used to estimate
the potential output. In particular, following a unitary decrease in potential output,
the output gap is perceived for more than 7 quarters as negative whereas it is actually
positive. The forecast error leads optimal policy to deviate from its benchmark value of
full information causing a persistent in￿ ation increase (about 12 quarters) in comparison
with the temporary e⁄ect under complete information. When the real unit labor cost7
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indicator is instead available to the central bank, the forecast error turns out to be quan-
titatively negligible. As a consequence, the optimal policy does not deviate substantially
from its benchmark of full information. In this case potential output uncertainty does
not produce quantitative noticeable consequences on in￿ ation dynamics.
The results in this paper are in line with the ￿ndings of Lippi and Neri (2007) for
the euro area. Using a small DSGE model estimated through likelihood-based methods
and under the assumption of imperfect information, the authors analyse the information
role of the unit labor cost and monetary aggregates. They show that the former contains
useful information on potential output that help to stabilize the output gap target.
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section presents the model. Section 3 illustrates
the estimation details and comments the results. Section 4 analyses the quantitative
e⁄ects of signal extraction errors arising from potential output uncertainty and, along
this dimension, the usefulness of real unit labor cost as a monetary policy indicator.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model economy
The model, taken from Ehrmann and Smets (2003), consists of the following equations:
yt = ￿yt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)yt+1jt ￿ ￿(it ￿ ￿t+1jt) + uy;t; (1)
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t+1jt + ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt) + u￿;t; (2)
￿ yt = ￿￿ yt￿1 + u￿ y;t: (3)
where ￿t; yt; ￿ yt; and it denote, respectively, in￿ ation, output, potential output and the
nominal short term interest rate. The preference shock uy;t, the cost - push shock u￿;t
and the potential output shock u￿ y;t are i.i.d. innovations with zero mean and covariance
matrix ￿2
u:
Since in this speci￿cation the dynamics of output and in￿ ation depend on both lagged
and expected future values, the model is considered as a hybrid version of more traditional
backward looking models such as in Svensson (1997a, 1997b) and purely forward looking
models such as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999).
The central bank chooses a path for the short-term interest rate minimizing the in-
tertemporal loss function (4) which is over three policy goals: in￿ ation, output gap and








t+￿ + ￿(yt+￿ ￿ ￿ yt+￿)




The relative weights ￿ and ￿ synthesize the preferences of the policymaker over the related
policy targets.8
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The central bank and the other agents infer the state of the economy on the basis of
three indicators. Such indicators provide contemporaneous but noisy measures of output,
in￿ ation and real unit labor cost (yt
￿;￿t
￿;ct
￿; respectively) and are represented by the
following vector of measurables:
yt
￿ = yt + vy;t; (5)
￿t
￿ = ￿t + v￿;t; (6)
ct
￿ = ct + vc;t: (7)
The measurement errors in the vector v are assumed to be i.i.d. with covariance matrix
￿2
v and they are uncorrelated with the vector of innovations u. According to the New
Keynesian paradigm, the ￿rms￿inability to adjust prices optimally every period creates
the existence of a wedge between output and its natural level (output gap). As shown,
among others, by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the output gap is proportional to
deviations of real marginal cost from steady state. Hence, a measure of real marginal
cost can be used to approximate (up to a scalar factor) the true, or model-based, output
gap. In line with this result and, following Lippi and Neri (2007), I extent the model
assuming that the actual value of real unit labor cost ct is given by:
ct = ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt): (8)
Agents and the policymaker in the economy have symmetric information both on the
model parameters, ￿ ￿ [￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿2
u;￿2
v] and on the whole history of the ob-
servables, therefore the information set It at period t is represented by It ￿ fZ￿;￿ ￿ t;￿g:
Restricting the attention to the case in which central bank operates under discretion,
following Svensson and Woodford (2003) the equilibrium (i.e. Markov perfect) under
discretion is characterized by the optimal policy rule being a linear function of the current
estimate of the predetermined variables. The equilibrium law of motion of the state,
forward-looking and indicator variables as well as the optimal predictor of the state
vector, are given by:
it = FXtjt; (9)
Xt+1 = HXt + JXtjt + Cuut+1; (10)
Zt = LXt + MXtjt + vt; (11)
xt = GXtjt + G
1(Xt ￿ Xtjt); (12)
Xtjt = Xtjt￿1 + K[L(Xt ￿ Xtjt￿1) + vt]: (13)9
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The matrices F;G;G1;H;J;K;L and M are de￿ned in Svensson and Woodford (2003)
and depend on the parameters in ￿, whereas X
0
t ￿ [ yt￿1 ￿t￿1 ￿ yt uy;t u￿;t it￿1 ]; x
0
t ￿ [ yt
￿t ]; u
0




￿] stand for, respectively, the predetermined
state variables, the forward-looking variables, the structural shocks, the observables and,
￿nally, it is the central bank￿ s policy instrument.
As in recent papers by Schorfheide (2001), Smets and Wouters (2003) and FernÆndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez (2004), the model is estimated using Bayesian methods.
The next section focuses on the estimation methodology and comments the empirical
￿ndings.
3 Estimation
This section illustrates the estimation of the model by means of Bayesian techniques.
The data ft used in the estimation are the short-term nominal interest rate and the three
observables of the theoretical model: output, in￿ ation and real unit labor cost.1 The
measurement equation is given by:




￿0represents the state variables of system (10-13) and e2;t :
e2;t ￿ Dvt + ￿t; (15)
is the vector of measurement errors which is inclusive of ￿t ￿
￿
0 0 0 ￿i;t
￿0
: Since the
measurement errors already appear in the theoretical model (the vector vt), the element in
￿t associated with the observables are assumed to be identically zero. The measurement
error ￿i;t on the interest rate is instead needed in order to avoid a stochastic singularity
problem. The measurement equation (14) and the law of motion of the states St represent
a state space system to which the Kalman ￿lter as in Sargent (1989) can be applied.
The posterior densities of the model parameters are then computed combining the
likelihood function with di⁄use prior distributions. The analytical derivation of the like-
lihood function as well as technical details concerning prior distributions are described in
the appendix.
1 This analysis uses U.S. data. Output is measured by the log of seasonally-adjusted real gross domestic
product in chained 2000 dollars, the in￿ ation rate is provided by the log of the quaterly changes in the
seasonally adjusted GDP implicit price de￿ ator, real unit labor cost is represented by the series of the
log of labor income share in the non-farm business sector and ￿nally, the three-month U.S. Treasury
bill rate provides the measure of the nominal interest rate (expressed in percentages per quarter). The
data are quarterly and run from 1960:1 through 2005:4. Real variables are linearly detrended before the
estimation whereas nominal variables are demeaned.10
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3.1 Estimation results
The analysis produces reasonable posterior distributions for the model parameters. Data
are informative in the sense that posterior distributions are more concentrated and many
of them, are shifted relative to the priors. Table 1 reports relevant statistics of prior
distributions, the estimated posterior medians and 95% con￿dence intervals of posterior
distributions.2
Focusing on the posterior distribution of the backward-looking component of the
New-Keynesian Phillips curve, one observes that the posterior distribution has a small
dispersion with a range that goes from 0.43 to 0.53. These ￿ndings imply a degree
of in￿ ation inertia greater than in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) supporting the view that
both backward looking and forward looking behavior are important in shaping the U.S.
in￿ ation dynamics. The posterior distribution of the Phillips curve slope suggests a
signi￿cant e⁄ect of real activity on in￿ ation. The posterior median is 0.06 and it is
consistent to the estimates obtained by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) and Gal￿, Gertler and
Lopez - Salido (2005) using GMM3.
Regarding the structural parameters of the aggregate demand equation, the estimation
suggests that both backward and forward looking components are signi￿cant in explaining
output dynamics. The posterior mean of the elasticity of output to the real interest
rate is 0.15 and it is consistent with previous results found in the Real Business Cycle
literature. The analysis also delivers plausible estimates for the parameters describing
the preferences of the monetary authority. The posterior mean of the weight attached to
the output gap ￿ is 0.51 suggesting that the policymaker looks out for the deviation of
output from its natural level and it is at odds with the estimates of Dennis (2006) and
Lippi and Neri (2007) for the euro area. The estimate of ￿ (0.62) provides evidence of
a substantial degree of interest rate smoothing. The estimates of the structural shocks
(￿u) show that demand and cost-push shocks have the largest standard deviation. The
k-step ahead forecast error variance decomposition of Table 2 indicates that cost-push
shocks are the main source of ￿ uctuations for in￿ ation and they also explain a substantial
part of the interest rate volatility at all horizons. Demand shocks are the main source of
output ￿ uctuations, even though for longer horizons the contributions of potential output
and cost-push shocks increase. Demand shocks also explain more than one half of the
variance of the interest rate and large part of the output gap volatility. The estimates
also show that the measurement error concerning real unit labor cost is rather small. The
measurement errors of output and in￿ ation are higher (0.20 and 0.16, respectively), even
2 Posterior distributions are based on 50000 draws obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings sampling
algorithm. The variance of the innovation in the MH has been set in order to get an acceptance rate
of 30%. The cumulative sum of draws statistic (CUMSUM) is used to check for convergence. This is
achieved after 30000 iterations.
3 In a ￿rst version of this paper, the model was estimated by excluding the unit labor cost indicator.
The estimation results showed that the Phillips curve slope estimate was close to zero and moreover, the
standard deviations of the cost-push shock and the measurement errors were very high. These ￿ndings
suggested to re-estimate the model taking into account a better proxy for the output gap rather than
the detrended GDP (e.g. Gal￿ and Gertler (1999)).11
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if the variance decomposition analysis of Table 2 indicates that they have a marginal role
in explaining the variables￿￿ uctuations.
4 Potential Output Uncertainty and Monetary Pol-
icy
Using the estimates of the structural parameters and of the monetary authority￿ s objec-
tives, this section analyses the quantitative relevance of the imperfect information about
potential output for monetary policy. The analysis is conducted examining the dynamic
responses of some variables of interest to several shocks and in particular, comparing
outcomes of three di⁄erent cases.
The ￿rst case is one with complete information (CI) which implies that all agents in
the economy observe potential output and therefore, they can perfectly derive the nature
of the shocks that hit the economy. In the second case, the central bank and the private
sector are subject to incomplete information (II) about potential output. This implies
that agents do not observe potential output directly and they have to infer the state
of the economy on the basis of three noisy indicators: output, in￿ ation and real unit
labor cost. Finally, in the third case, agents are still subject to incomplete information
about potential output but the real unit labor cost indicator is removed from the vector
of observables. Starting with the case in which the real unit labor cost indicator is not
available to the agents in the economy, Figure 1 presents the responses of the actual
and perceived output gap, the output gap forecast error, the in￿ ation and the nominal
interest rate following a unitary decrease in potential output4.
Two main results emerge. First, the error in forecasting the output gap is large
and persistent. For about 7 quarters, the central bank estimates the output gap as
negative while this is actually positive. The origins of such error stem from the fact that
the central bank just observes a raise in price and a fall in output but, under imperfect
information, does not perfectly recognize if those e⁄ects are caused by a negative potential
output shock or a positive cost-push shock (or a combination of both). As a result, it
is forced to assign some probability to the fact that this is actually a positive cost-push
shock which causes an over-prediction of the potential output. Second, the forecast error
leads the optimal interest rate to deviate greatly from its benchmark value under perfect
information causing a persistent raise in in￿ ation (about 12 quarters) in comparison with
the temporary e⁄ect under complete information.
Figure 2 analyses the responses of the variables of interest following a positive cost -
push shock. As a consequence of the signal extraction problem, the central bank assigns
some probability that a negative potential output shock is hitting the economy, causing an
under - prediction of the potential output. However, since temporary cost-push shocks are
estimated to be more volatile than those to potential output, the magnitude of the forecast
4 The impulse responses of this section are based on the posterior median.12
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error is small and the optimal policy is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from its benchmark of
full information.
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate the responses of the variables of interest when the central
bank can infer the level of potential output based on output, in￿ ation as well as real unit
labor cost. The key results of these two ￿gures are that, in both cases, when the real
unit labor cost indicator is available to the agents, the errors in forecasting the output
gap are quantitatively negligible. As a consequence, the optimal monetary policy rule as
well as the in￿ ation dynamics almost completely overlap their benchmarks of complete
information.
The ￿nding that the forecast error is very small when real unit labor cost is used
to estimate the output gap suggests that this indicator contains useful information on
potential output. At the same time, this result con￿rms the objection raised by Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2002), Gal￿ and Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005) about using
the detrended GDP (the deviations of log GDP from a smooth trend) as a proxy for the
output gap in empirical applications.
Figure 5 presents an informal assessment of this point based on the patterns of cross-
correlations between two alternative output gap estimates and the actual in￿ ation. The
red line in the ￿gure corresponds to the output gap estimate obtained using both the
detrended GDP and real unit labor cost while the dotted line corresponds to the coun-
terfactual estimate obtained by removing the unit labor cost indicator from the central
bank￿ s vector of observables. A comparison of these two alternative measures of the
output gap with actual in￿ ation (solid line) clearly indicates that the output gap series
estimated using real unit labor cost presents an higher correlation with actual in￿ ation
even though both are positive and statistically signi￿cant (0.60 and 0.42, respectively).
Finally, I study the usefulness of unit labor cost indicator through the e⁄ects it pro-
duces on some welfare measures. Once again, I analyse how economic performance is
a⁄ected by the removal of such indicator from the vector of observables. Table 3 reports
the standard deviation of target variables (output gap, in￿ ation and interest rate changes)
and central bank expected losses. The second column considers the case in which all in-
dicators are available to the central bank. The third one instead shows the values of the
standard deviations in the case in which unit labor costs are eliminated from the central
bank￿ s information set. This exercise shows that expected losses increase when that indi-
cator is removed from the vector of observables. This e⁄ect is mainly due to the raise of
the standard deviation of the output gap. On the contrary, the volatility of the interest
rate changes declines marginally. This last result could be due to the fact that when unit
labor costs are removed from the information set, the greater uncertainty concerning the
estimate of potential output causes a reduction in monetary policy activism.13
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5 Robustness
5.1 Changes in priors
An important result of the previous section is that following a potential output shock the
output gap forecast error is quantitatively negligible when real unit labor cost is included
in the central bank￿ s vector of observables. Equation (13) provides the optimal predictor
of the state vector using the Kalman ￿lter. As discussed in Svensson and Woodford








where the matrix P ￿ Cov[Xt ￿Xtjt￿1] is the covariance matrix for the prediction errors
(Xt ￿ Xtjt￿1) and ful￿lls:









The Kalman gain matrix K provides the optimal weights on the vector of observable
variables. Namely, row j of K gives the optimal weights in updating of element j of Xt:
Column l of K gives the weights a particular observable variable Zlt receives in updating
the elements of Xt: Note that equations (16) and (17) imply that the elements of the
Kalman gain matrix K depend upon the degree of noise in the indicators, i.e. the variance
of the measurement errors. Therefore, if the degree of noise of a particular indicator
becomes large, the optimal weight on that indicator decreases. Since the estimated degree
of noise of real unit labor cost is rather small, the weight that it receives in updating
the potential output estimate is high. It is therefore important to understand to what
extent this result is sensitive to changes in the prior distribution of the variance of the
measurement error. In order to do so, I estimate the model assuming for this parameter
a prior distribution with a larger dispersion (i.e. the variance is 1000 times higher). The
median of the posterior distribution slightly increases to 0.15. Despite the raise in the
prior range, the posterior standard deviation remains small (0.02).
5.2 Alternative timing for indicators
Because information on real variables is usually released with a quarter lag, this section
studies the sensitivity of the results to the assumption that both yo
t and co
t are related to
the previous period value of output and labor cost:
y
o
t = yt￿1 + vy;t; (18)
c
o
t = ct￿1 + vc;t: (19)
Figure 6 presents the forecast error output gap, the short-term nominal interest rate and
in￿ ation following a unitary decrease in potential output. The ￿gure compares again the14
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case of complete information about the state of the economy (solid line) with the case
in which potential output is not observed (incomplete information). The dashed line
corresponds to the case in which agents infer the state of the economy using three noisy
indicators: output, in￿ ation and real unit labor cost. The dotted line corresponds to the
counterfactual case obtained by removing real unit labor cost from agents￿information
set.
When real variables are observed with a quarter lag, the output gap forecast error
is, under incomplete information, quite large immediately after the shock. When the
central bank￿ s information set only includes output and in￿ ation, the over-estimation
of potential output causes monetary policy to deviate substantially from its benchmark
of full information, producing a large and persistent raise in in￿ ation. The output gap
forecast error instead becomes negligible 3-4 quarters after the shock when unit labor
cost indicator is available to the agents. Monetary policy turns out to be too loose only
in the ￿rst quarter after the shock with a transitory raise in in￿ ation.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the recent literature that studies the quantitative implications
of the imperfect information about potential output for the conduct of monetary pol-
icy. For this purpose, a small New Keynesian model which explicitly accounts for the
imperfect information problem is estimated by means of Bayesian techniques. Using the
estimates of the structural parameters and of the monetary authority￿ s objectives, this
paper illustrates that the quantitative implications of potential output uncertainty cru-
cially hinge on the policymaker￿ s information set. When the information set only includes
noisy measures of output and in￿ ation, this work corroborates the conclusion by Ehrmann
and Smets (2003) that following a potential output shock, the central bank makes a large
and persistent error in forecasting the output gap. This error leads the optimal policy
to deviate from the benchmark value of full information creating an e⁄ect on in￿ ation
which is completely absent in the case of perfect information. However, when monetary
policy makes use of the real unit labour cost indicator then potential output uncertainty
turns out to have quantitatively negligible consequences on in￿ ation dynamics and on
the policy makers￿welfare.
Altogether, the results of this paper are twofold. First, the real unit labor cost plays an
important role for monetary policy. Such indicator provides information about potential
output and it strongly improves the central bank￿ s ability in making stabilization policy
more e⁄ective. Second, this paper contributes to the recent debate on bad policy as
opposed to bad luck to explain the so-called Great In￿ation. Since the potential output
mismeasurement is quantitatively negligible when the policymaker uses e¢ ciently all
the information available, the potential output misperception errors could not, with the
bene￿t of hindsight, account for the high in￿ ation episodes of the 1970s.
The relevance of these ￿ndings suggests that some working assumptions are worth
further analyses. First, it is important to understand to what extent the results depend15
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on the linear-quadratic framework used. In this context, uncertainty and imperfect in-
formation do not in￿ uence the optimal monetary policy because it is characterized by
certainty equivalence. Second, the small DSGE model used in this paper is very sim-
ple and therefore potentially misspeci￿ed. Integrating capital accumulation, sticky wages
and capital adjustment costs in the analysis as in the current generation of DSGE models
would be a highly useful undertaking.
Appendix
The Likelihood Function
This appendix illustrates the main steps for the computation of the likelihood function
using the Kalman ￿lter as in Sargent (1989).
First, the solution of the model is transformed into a state space form. Hence from
the system (9-13), I derive the law of motion of the unobserved states and a measurement
equation that relates the elements of the states vector to the observables.
Using (13) and (10) I get:
Xt+1 = (H + JKL)Xt + J(I ￿ KL)Xtjt￿1 + JKvt + Cuut+1; (20)
taking expectations and using (13) I obtain:
Xt+1jt = (H + J)(I ￿ KL)Xtjt￿1 + (H + J)KLXt + (H + J)Kvt: (21)
I can rewrite (20) and (21) as follows
St+1 = ASt + Be1;t+1; (22)







(H + JKL) J(I ￿ KL)
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In the same way, substituting (13) into (11) and (9) I get:
Zt = (L + MKL)Xt + M(I ￿ KL)Xtjt￿1 + (I + MK)vt; (23)
it = (F ￿ FKL)Xtjt￿1 + FKLXt + FKvt: (24)
Finally, I can rewrite (23) and (24) in state-space form:





t it]; C =
￿
L + MKL M(I ￿ KL)








adding a vector of measurement errors I get:
ft = CSt + e2;t; (26)
where e2;t ￿ Dvt+￿t; is the vector of measurement errors and ￿t ￿
￿































The Kalman ￿lter is then applied to the state space model (18) and (22). The ￿lter
takes the observations of ft for t = 1;2;:::::T and works recursively to construct a series
of forecast errors as follows:
wt = ft ￿ ftjt￿1 = ft ￿ CStjt￿1; (30)
where ftjt￿1 is the prediction of the observable variables given the information available
at period t and the forecast error covariance matrix is given by:
￿t ￿ E(wtw
0
t) = E(ft ￿ ftjt￿1)(ft ￿ ftjt￿1)
0
= (31)
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= Ef[C(St ￿ Stjt￿1) + e2;t][C(St ￿ Stjt￿1) + e2;t]g
0
= (33)












tjt￿1 = E(St ￿ Stjt￿1)(St ￿ Stjt￿1)
0:
Since by construction, the forecast error wt is serially uncorrelated and normally
distributed for all t = 1;2;::::;T with mean zero and covariance matrix ￿t; then log-



















The optimal predictor of the states vector using the Kalman ￿lter is given by:


























where the matrix Kt is the Kalman gain and ￿2
t+1jt ￿ E(St+1 ￿ St+1jt)(St+1 ￿ St+1jt)
0:
Prior Distributions
The ￿rst four columns of Table 1 present prior distributions of the model parameters. For
convenience, it is typically assumed that all parameters are a priori independent. Prior
distributions are centered around standard calibrated values of the parameters used in the
literature while standard errors are chosen in order to cover the range of existing estimates
and to avoid to impose too much structure on the data. Since priors are loose, the exact
form of the densities is chosen for computational convenience. For the parameters ￿;￿
and ￿ which must lie in the interval [0,1) Beta distributions are chosen. All the variances
of shocks are assumed to be distributed as a Gamma distribution because it assures a
positive variance with a rather large domain. Gamma distribution is also used for the
in￿ ation elasticity to the output gap ￿ in order to include in its domain the wide range
of estimated and calibrated parameter values suggested by the literature. The normal
distribution is chosen for the remaining parameters. The discount factor ￿ is calibrated
to be 0.99.18
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Tables and ￿gures
Table 1 - Posterior distributions
Prior distributions Posterior distributions
Name Density Mean St.dev. Median 95 % interval
￿ Beta 0.5 0.22 0.51 [0.43, 0.53]
￿ Beta 0.5 0.22 0.59 [0.59, 0.60]
￿ Normal 0.5 0.10 0.13 [0.12, 0.19]
￿ Gamma 0.2 0.14 0.06 [0.03, 0.10]
￿ Normal 0.2 0.15 0.52 [0.50, 0.52]
￿ Beta 0.75 0.14 0.62 [0.60, 0.63]
￿ Beta 0.75 0.14 0.85 [0.84, 0.87]
￿ Normal 1.00 0.10 1.27 [1.22, 1.28]
￿u;￿ Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.54 [0.34, 0.64]
￿u;y Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.65 [0.53, 0.71]
￿u;￿ y Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.39 [0.25, 0.47]
￿v;￿ Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.16 [0.15, 0.21]
￿v;y Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.20 [0.20, 0.21]
￿v;r Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.52 [0.50, 0.53]
￿v;c Gamma 0.002 0.001 0.09 [0.09, 0.10]21
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Table 2 - Forecast error variance decomposition
Fundamental shocks Measurement errors
t = 1 u￿ y uy u￿ vy v￿ vc
output 0.48 97.95 0.27 1.04 0.20 0.06
in￿ ation 0.41 2.37 95.42 0.06 1.75 0
int. rate 6.77 49.20 37.21 1.65 4.96 0.22
output gap 15.71 82.96 0.23 0.88 0.17 0.05
int. rate changes 6.94 50.49 38.19 0.71 3.35 0.31
t = 4
output 10.00 76.97 11.80 0.63 0.55 0.06
in￿ ation 0.93 5.71 92.29 0.06 1.00 0
int. rate 6.28 53.45 38.19 0.70 1.32 0.06
output gap 13.72 73.78 11.31 0.60 0.53 0.06
int. rate changes 7.07 50.06 38.59 0.70 3.28 0.30
t = 10
output 19.61 58.65 20.72 0.48 0.50 0.04
in￿ ation 0.97 6.04 91.99 0.06 0.94 0
int. rate 6.23 54.08 37.74 0.66 1.24 0.06
output gap 11.95 64.23 22.69 0.52 0.55 0.05
int. rate changes 7.18 50.34 38.78 0.64 2.81 0.25
t = 100
output 20.78 57.71 20.50 0.47 0.49 0.04
in￿ ation 0.97 6.04 91.99 0.06 0.94 0
int. rate 6.34 53.98 37.73 0.66 1.24 0.06
output gap 11.94 64.15 22.79 0.52 0.55 0.05
int. rate changes 7.2 50.31 38.79 0.64 2.80 0.25
Table 3 - Targets￿standard deviations under di⁄erent information sets
Indicators
st.dev. all indicators no unit labor costs
output gap 1.16 1.31
in￿ ation 1.37 1.37
interest changes 1.03 1.00
% increase in expected losses - 6.7622
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Fig. 2. Responses to a positive cost-push shock (real unit labor cost is not available)24
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Fig. 6. Responses to a negative potential output shock (real variables are observed with a
quarter lag)28
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